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THE TUMULTUOUS WORLD OF GLOBAL MARITIME TRANSPORTATION:
A CAUTIONARY TALE FOR SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGERS
Kent N. Gourdin
College of Charleston
ABSTRACT
The past five years have seen unprecedented changes transform the way goods are moved around the
world. The expanded Panama Canal now permits larger vessels as well as simultaneous transits in each
direction. Coincidently, steamship lines began purchasing a new generation of bigger ships, forcing ports in
the United States to make very large investments in new infrastructure. When examined within the context
of other environmental events impacting global trade, the total effect has been to put the maritime industry
into a state of flux. This paper will examine these and other important issues before offering conclusions
intended to help managers develop successful supply chain strategies in today’s uncertain post-Panamax
world.
INTRODUCTION
The past five years have seen unprecedented
changes transform the way goods are moved
around the world. The expanded Panama Canal
opened for business on June 27, 2016. Widely
hailed as a game changer on the scale of the original,
the increased capacity of the new locks now permits
larger vessels as well as simultaneous transits in each
direction, both serious limitations of the pre-existing
canal. Coincidently, steamship lines began
purchasing a new generation of ships that are too
big even for the larger locks. In order to handle
these large vessels, ports in the United States have
been forced to make significant investments in new
infrastructure. When examined within the context of
other environmental events impacting global trade,
the total effect has been to put the maritime industry
into a state of disarray that has made managing the
transportation element of the firm’s global supply
chain especially challenging. This paper will examine
these and other important issues before offering
conclusions intended to help managers develop
successful supply chain strategies in today’s
uncertain post-Panamax world.

THE EXPANSION OF THE PANAMA CANAL
The Panama Canal expansion officially began on
October 22, 2006 with the passage of a national
referendum in Panama approving the project. Work
actually commenced on September 7 the following
year with an estimated completion date of October
2014. From the outset, the Panama Canal
Authority (ACP) stated that the purpose of the
expansion was to double the Canal’s capacity in
order to accommodate much larger container
vessels, an issue discussed in more detail in a
subsequent section (Panama Canal Authority,
2018). However, most U.S. ports were ill prepared
to handle such large ships on a regular basis, either
because of water depth issues, landside
shortcomings, or both, and immediately initiated
steps to remedy deficiencies so as to take
advantage of the anticipated boon. On the Atlantic
Coast, the major ports of New York, New Jersey,
Baltimore, and Virginia have all recently completed
or nearly completed post-Panamax expansions.
Charleston is poised to begin a dredging project that
will deepen its harbor to 52 feet at mean low water
(MLW) by 2020 (South Carolina State Ports
Authority, 2016), while the Port of Savannah is
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planning to increase its depth to 47 feet at roughly
the same time (Georgia State Ports Authority,
2018a). PortMiami recently completed $1.3 billion
in infrastructure upgrades that will improve vessel,
truck, and rail access to its container facility
(Klulisch E., 2017). The Gulf Coast’s major ports,
despite facing much shallower water because of the
coastal profile, are planning similar upgrades. At
Bayport, the Gulf’s largest and newest container
facility, port authorities are dredging deeper
channels, expanding berthing space, adding
container yard acreage, and installing post-Panamax
cranes (Port of Houston, 2018). The major West
Coast ports of Oakland and LA/Long Beach
already enjoy sufficient water depth and are
focusing their improvement efforts on systems to
speed ship loading/unloading and expedite the
movement of cargo into and out of the respective
terminals.
Clearly, U.S. ports, regardless of size, expect to
benefit from the expansion and are, at great cost,
proceeding accordingly. Whether or not they
should be, remains to be seen. No port wants to be
left out, because the risk of “missing the boat” by
doing nothing is simply too high. That said, these
projects are expensive and complex, leading to
costs which are often underestimated at the outset.
Once begun, the work must be completed
regardless of the extra funds required. Because
long-term benefits are very difficult to know and
quantify, they tend to be overstated at the beginning
to justify the work. Sometimes the port/bridge/
waterway is built only to discover twenty years later
that it probably shouldn’t have been.
THE CURRENT SITUATION
Unfortunately, as is often the case, the world has
changed in unexpected ways since expansion work
began. First, the present state of the global
container shipping industry will be scrutinized with
respect to the growth in ship size and the reduction
24
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in the number of carriers. Then, containerized cargo
flows into and out of U.S. ports will be discussed,
followed by a closer look at critical problems
affecting some domestic ports. Finally, something
that cannot be ignored is the ongoing uncertainty
surrounding the Trump administration’s handling of
foreign trade issues and in what ways their policies
might affect global maritime transportation.
Global Maritime Industry
Two of the most significant and recent changes to
the container shipping industry have been the rapid
growth in vessel sizes and the unprecedented
consolidation of carriers.
Vessel Sizes
Containerized shipping actually began in the mid1950s with the movement of truck-trailers. The
inefficiencies associated with transporting what are
essentially boxes with wheels quickly became
apparent, and the modern container was created
and standardized in either twenty-foot or forty-foot
lengths. In fact, the twenty-foot equivalent unit, or
TEU, is the global standard unit of measure for
containerized freight transportation. One TEU
represents a single twenty-foot long container while
two TEUs could refer to two twenty-foot containers
or one forty-foot container. Thus, while ship
capacity is commonly quoted in TEUs, the number
of actual containers on the vessel represents a mix
of twenty-foot and forty-foot boxes that,
theoretically, will always be lower than its quoted
capacity. By the mid-1960s, ships specifically
designed and built to transport nothing but
containers began to appear, and the rest is history.
As shown in Figure 1, growth in ship size and
carrying capacity has continued ever since. Given
the dimensions of the original Panama Canal locks,
vessels were broadly categorized at that time as
being either Panamax (roughly 5,000 TEU, the
largest size able to use the canal) or Post-Panamax
(too big to use the canal). Those classifications
remain, but are different for the expanded locks

where Panamax now refers to vessels of
approximately 13,000 TEU capacity or higher.
As shown in Figure 2, beginning in 2010, the
average size of the global container fleet surged as
lines began buying megaships, a term loosely

referring to vessels capable of moving 18,000 TEU
or higher. In fact, orders for 50 such vessels of
between 18,000 and 22,000 TEU were placed in
2015. Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC)
deploys the largest number (90) of what are
sometimes referred to as Ultra Large Container
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FIGURE 2

Ships (ULCS) and has 11 on order that can each
accommodate 23,350 TEU (Visser, 2018).
Unfortunately, the arrival of these new ships
coincided with a flattening of global trade, resulting
in a glut of capacity chasing smaller amounts of
cargo. Beginning May 1, 2016, contract rates fell
to historic lows, some as low as $700 per 40-foot
container moving eastbound across the Pacific
where they remain to this day. Unless these rates
cover break-even costs of approximately $1500,
the carrier will lose money (Paris and Walker,
2018). While an in-depth examination of slot costs
(i.e. costs incurred to move one container) is
beyond the scope of this paper, suffice to say that
empirical data do not support the hypothesis that
unit costs necessarily decrease with increments of
vessel size, especially beyond 8,000 TEU, nor that
TEU-mile cost decreases as ship size increases.
Because fuel makes up roughly 40% of these costs,
the savings are greater when the price of oil is high.
26
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A 2015 comparison of slot cost savings per round
trip voyage on a typical Asia-North Europe service
of an 18,000 TEU ship versus one with 14,000
TEUs showed that savings had reduced from $76
per slot to $38 per slot based a reduction in fuel
costs (Knowler G., 2015). Instead, the economies
of container ship voyages appear to depend on
many factors unrelated to size. For example, larger
vessels are also faster and can, therefore, provide
better service and utilization of assets. On the other
hand, they are often harder to handle necessitating
more demanding requests, in terms of both money
and time, related to navigating channels along rivers/
canals, port berthing, port access channels, and
cargo handling facilities. In other words, because
there is a tradeoff between the positive returns
earned at sea and the negative returns while in port,
the overall efficiency of a ship may depend
ultimately on the total time taken to complete a
voyage dock to dock (Gkonis and Harilaos, 2009).

Even before the August 31, 2016 Hanjin collapse
(more about that later), spot rates were trending
higher. In November of that year, the spot rate for a
forty-foot container was $1843 versus $623 the
previous April. In response, carrier managers
began to reduce capacity by selling or scrapping
smaller, relatively new vessels that are able to move
through both the old and new sets of locks on the
Panama Canal (Tirschwell, 2016). In April of 2018,
the spot rate for a forty-foot container from
Shanghai to the West Coast was $1127, up 19.3%
over the previous week. Negotiations for
transpacific trade lane contract rates normally begin
with the largest customers signing contracts in late
March or early April. These accounts, in turn, set
the floor for service contract rates that run from
May 1 through April 30 the next year. Contract
negotiations are then concluded with small and midsize beneficial cargo owners who generally pay
several hundred dollars more per forty-foot
equivalent unit (FEU) than do the largest shippers
(Mongelluzzo, 2018). However, if the market
remains firm after the Chinese New Year holiday,
then there can be a pressure from shippers to tie
down their yearly rate agreements earlier (Wackett,
2017). However, the level of uncertainty is
illustrated by the fact that some industry experts feel
the overhaul of the market could help prevent
excess capacity and problems on freight rates, while
others fear that shipping lines might cut their rates to
pursue market share for their new alliances or order
ships to beef up services. Finally, idle ships could
be put back into service relatively quickly, further
driving rates down (Wright, 2017).
Industry Consolidation
For most of the carriers, the damage resulting from
falling rates has already been done. Of the largest
12 shipping companies that published financial
results in 2016, 11 announced huge losses. A.P.
Moller-Maersk, the industry leader, lost $1.9 billion,
their largest negative result ever (A.P. MøllerMaersk A/S Annual Report, 2016) while CMA
CGM went from a $567 million profit in 2015 to a

$325 million net lost in 2016 (Barnard, 2017).
Perhaps the most shocking event was the sudden
collapse of Hanjin Shipping that stranded ships,
crews, and cargo around the world for months. In
addition, other mergers were announced in 2016.
CMA CGM acquired Singapore’s NOL and its
APL brand; Hapag-Lloyd bought United Arab
Shipping Company (USAC); China Ocean Shipping
Company (COSCO) combined with China
Shipping Container Line (CSCL); and Maersk
purchased Hamburg Süd (Hand, 2016).
Clearly, 2016 was a disastrous year for container
shipping and did not bode well for the ability of
smaller lines to compete with the behemoths. In
fact, consolidation activities continued through 2017
and into the follow year. COSCO hopes to
complete their acquisition of OOCL in June 2018
(Goh, 2018), while Japan’s big three shipping
groups (“K” Line, Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (MOL), and
NYK) are spinning off their respective container
shipping businesses into a new joint-venture
company called Ocean Network Express (ONE).
The new entity will have a total capacity of 1.4
million TEU, which would rank as the sixth largest in
the world and have a global market share of
approximately 7% (Paris and Tsuneoka, 2018).
There have also been unconfirmed rumors the
Taiwanese lines Evergreen and Yang Ming will
combine (https://fairplay.ihs.com, 2018). The
result of all this activity is that 90% of total container
capacity on major trades routes will be controlled
by three carrier alliances made up of the following
companies (Paris, 2017): 2M (Maersk, MSC),
Ocean Alliance (CMA CGM, COSCO, Evergreen,
OOCL); THE Alliance (Hapag Lloyd, ONE, Yang
Ming).
Containerized Cargo Flows through U.S. Ports
As shown in Table 1, while the ports on the U.S.
West Coast are perceived to occupy a very high
profile position in U.S. container trades, the U.S.
East and Gulf Coasts actually handle more freight.
Vol. 29 No. 2
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There are several reasons for this change. First, the
gradual shift of off-shore manufacturing from China
to Southeast and Southern Asia has made the
choice of reaching U.S. markets via the Suez Canal
more competitive (Prozzi and Overmyer, 2018).
Second, congestion on and off the West Coast
terminals can seriously impede the flow of goods
into and out of the ports even on the best of days.
Third, contentious labor relations keep the specter
of slowdowns and strikes there on the West Coast
an ever-present threat, especially at peak shipping
times. Fourth, many of the eastern ports are
extremely efficient, making them an attractive option
for shippers and carriers alike. The long term effect
of these West Coast limitations has been to pull the
center of gravity for U.S. distribution activities
farther east. In sum, these obstacles to efficient
cargo handling on the West Coast, combined with
problematic intermodal services for the remainder of
28
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the eastbound journey, and emerging global
production centers, make using Eastern and Gulf
Ports an appealing alternative even if the ocean
portion of the total move is longer and/or costlier
(Conway, 2017).
In the short term, the demand for global
transportation will remain flat as growth in global
trade volumes have slowed in recent years, thanks
to a tepid economic recovery from the financial
crisis of 2008 and the changing structure of the
Chinese economy. Also, the Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP), aa trade agreement between
twelve Pacific Rim countries originally including the
United States, was intended to jump start global
trade among the signatories, however it has not
been implemented further harming global trade.
Among other things, the TPP contained measures to

lower trade barriers and establish an investor-state
dispute settlement mechanism. Though signed in
February of 2016, President Trump promptly
cancelled the agreement shortly after taking office,
opening the door for China to assume the leadership
position abrogated by the U.S (Mui, 2017).
However the Agreement was not signed as noted,
and trade has not increased as much as one would
have expected while the Agreement was being
negotiated. Longer term, there is little doubt that
global trade will increase, although by how much
and when remains in question.
THE IMPACT OF BIGGER CONTAINER
SHIPS ON U.S. PORTS
Congestion
Congestion can occur on both the shipside and the
landside. In LA/Long Beach, for example, megaships generate between 5,000 to more than 10,000
extra container moves per call. Assume one crane
can average 40 lifts per hour and 10,000 TEU are
coming off. If four cranes are utilized, the off load
will require almost 3 days, with the same amount of
time needed to load outbound containers.
Obviously using more cranes will speed the process
but may require that other vessels wait. Once the
containers are landed, they have to go somewhere.
As mentioned earlier, most carriers operate in
vessel-sharing alliances, which distribute containers
from as many as six individual lines each using a
different terminal with its own policies and
procedures. The model of carrier-owned chassis
has also changed and added complexity, with three
large chassis-leasing companies now providing
them. The interface between the port and the
intermodal transportation system also contributes to
the problem. Drayage industry issues such as a
shortage of drivers or long waits at terminal gates
can slow the flow of containers into and out of the
port. In fact, the simultaneous arrival of multiple
large ships can simply overwhelm the port and
swamp the long-distance rail system essential for

moving the containers to their final destination
(Mongelluzzo, 2016). Similar problems have
bedeviled the Port of New York and New Jersey in
recent years as well (Morley, 2016).
Labor Strife
Larger ships with many more containers exacerbate
the impact of work stoppages because the sheer
volumes that build up during a slowdown or strike
can overwhelm the system. Work stoppages
affected port operations on both sides of the
country in 2016, with the expected impacts from
larger ships making it difficult for ports to recover.
Though none were as disruptive as the West Coast
strike in 2002 (which lasted for 11days) or the 8day action there in 2012, just the thought of a similar
shutdown is enough to send ship operators scurrying
for alternative ports, a disruption in its own right.
However, the aftermath is arguably more disruptive
to supply chains than the strike itself. Port
operations alone can take weeks and even months
to return to normal. The big railroads suffer as well
because the flow of containers on their way to
affected ports must be stopped as soon as possible,
either at origin or some intermediate spot. Once the
dispute is resolved, the floodgates are opened and
transporting cargo out of the port becomes the
problem. During the strike, the companies lose a
massive amount of revenue because nothing is
moving; once the port reopens, the sheer volume of
outgoing containers overwhelms the rail system
leading to additional delays, lost cargo, and poor
service.
Because the upheaval in supply chains is so severe
and the potential for strikes on the West Coast is
ever present, retailers and direct shippers have
indicated in surveys that they are increasingly likely
to shift some of their cargo volume to East Coast
ports. Southeast ports like Charleston and
Savannah, which typically experience little to no
labor disruption, saw significant increases in volumes
in the second half of 2014 due to diversions. A
Vol. 29 No. 2
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permanent loss of some cargo for the West Coast
may be inevitable as shippers increasingly look at
the potential labor actions as a serious threat to the
security of their supply chains (http://
actlogisticsinc.com, 2015). Two-thirds of the U.S.
population lives east of the Mississippi River. Many
of the large retailers that dominate U.S.
containerized imports are based there as well and
have extensive retail store networkers in the eastern
half of the country, resulting in the “distribution pull”
discussed earlier.
PORT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
Ports are businesses like any other and must remain
competitive if they are to remain attractive to both
shippers and steamship lines. To that end, ports in
the United States have started on, or recently
completed, vary large infrastructure projects
intended to keep them viable in today’s environment
with these much larger ships. A few of these are
discussed below.
Dredging
The West Coast ports enjoy sufficient harbor depth
to handle the large ships, so much of their
investment has been in procuring larger cranes and
other equipment to service those vessels. While the
ports on the East Coast are making similar
purchases, they face other challenges as well due to
larger ships. As mentioned earlier, both Charleston
and Savannah are actively dredging their ports. The
Savannah project is especially daunting because it
requires deepening the entire 40-mile-long shipping
channel: the 18.5-mile outer harbor to 49 feet and
the Savannah River channel to 47 feet MLW
(2018). In each location, work only started after
completing planning and approval processes that
stretched across two decades. Miami has already
deepened its channel to 50 feet, while the Port of
Jacksonville and Port Everglades are pushing to do
the same thing (Kitchen, 2016).
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Development of Inland Ports
Again, in order to disperse the large numbers of
containers flowing as a result of larger ships, ports
have sought to spread the volume around to more
locations. For instance, in October 2013, the South
Carolina State Ports Authority (SCSPA) opened an
inland port in Greer, South Carolina, 212 miles
inland. This facility connects with port facilities in
Charleston via a dedicated daily rail service that
facilitates the rapid movement of containers out of
and into the port itself, effectively extending the
Port’s reach well beyond the borders of South
Carolina. The facility was so successful that the
SCSPA opened a similar facility in Dillon, South
Carolina in 2018 (SCSPA, 2018). The Georgia
Ports Authority is also planning to open their second
site, the Appalachian Regional Port in Chatsworth,
Georgia in October 2018 (Georgia Ports Authority,
2018b).
Raising the Bayonne Bridge in NY/NJ
Another reaction to larger ships involves the need to
provide higher vertical bridge clearances. The
project to raise the navigational height of the 151foot-tall bridge to 215 feet was completed in mid2017 (McDonald, 2017). Prior to that time, the
largest ships that could dock at the terminals in
Newark and Elizabeth, N.J., carried between 8,500
and 9,000 TEUs. However, the largest vessel ever
to call the port, the CMA-CGM Theodore
Roosevelt with a capacity of 14,400 TEU, made its
way to New Jersey in September after transiting the
Panama Canal (Villanova 2017).
Jasper Ocean Terminal
Perhaps the most ambitious project, in order to deal
with the larger ships, is the on-again/off-again effort
by the states of Georgia and South Carolina in the
southeastern part of the United States to develop a
new terminal on the South Carolina side of the
Savannah River that would be jointly-operated by

the port authorities in each state. The $4.5 billion,
bi-state project, is on again after more than two
decades of discussions and a series of lawsuits.
Once complete, it will handle seven million units of
shipping cargo that the ports in Savannah and
Charleston wouldn’t be able to process when they
reach capacity within the next 15 years. By 2040,
with the complete build out of the terminal, the Port
has the potential to create one million jobs and $9
billion in tax revenue between Georgia and South
Carolina, according to a 2010 study by the
University of Georgia and Wilbur Smith &
Associates. If/when the project is completed; it
would be the largest single land port in the United
States (Murdock, 2015).
OTHER TRADE AND CONTAINER
SHIPPING ISSUES
Political Instability in the United States
Political uncertainty will continue to characterize the
near term for managers of global logistics and
supply chain systems. The U.S. withdrawal from
the TPP was mentioned earlier. In April, President
Trump announced plans to impose a 25% tariff on
$50 billion worth of Chinese-made products and
followed up in late May with a decision to impose
tariffs on steel and aluminum imported from the
European Union (EU) (Zumbrun and Salama,
2018). Until a clear direction has been established
for U.S. international trade policies by the present
administration, strategic business decisions will need
to be made with care and include the ability to
quickly pivot in response to the winds of change.
However, the reality is that global trade will continue
growing in response to the booming e-commerce
demand, the shift of the Chinese market from a
focus on production to one of consumption, and, for
the time being, lower fuel prices.
Volatility in the Price of Oil
As alluded to earlier, petroleum prices rose steadily
during early 2018, but quickly fell late in May as

Saudi Arabia announced plans to increase
production (Petrov, 2018). The drop in oil prices is
welcome news for drivers, as well as transportation
companies and oil-importing countries like India that
buy a lot of energy. Unfortunately, the nation’s
producing the oil prefer higher prices which generate
the revenue upon which those governments depend
to fund their political agendas (Ibid). This
dichotomy virtually guarantees continued instability
in the world’s oil markets.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGERS
While the completion of the Panama Canal
expansion was touted as a “game changer,” the term
could be applied to many other issues discussed in
this paper. In essence, the game itself has changed
which in no way should minimize the
accomplishment of the construction of the Panama
Canal or its potential impact on the supply chain.
Given the immediate sense of unease, however,
supply chain managers must deal with simultaneous,
unprecedented, and perhaps more pressing changes
to their environment.
The introduction of mega-ships at a time of stagnant
global trade led to a consolidation of maritime
carriers into alliances that will undoubtedly leverage
their size and market power to negotiate higher rates
from shippers which will, in turn, make port
efficiencies a bigger factor in distribution decision
making. To expedite door-to-door delivery times
and mitigate the risk of shipment disruptions,
managers will opt for using ports where the chances
of congestion and labor issues are small, most of
which are on the Southeast or Gulf Coasts of the
U.S. In fact, a 2016 National Real Estate Investor
study confirmed that the East and Gulf Coasts are
currently experiencing the highest traffic growth, and
listed Savannah, Charleston, and Houston among
the five top performing non-West Coast Ports
(Carr, 2016). With the demand for prime
warehouse and distribution space expected to
Vol. 29 No. 2
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remain elevated for the next few years (Thompson,
2016), development will target those ports and the
customers/market areas they serve. Supply chain
managers would be wise to do the same thing.
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